Quantum computing isn’t a fantasy threat anymore — it’s a real cryptographic risk — but the idea that Bitcoin is being left to fend for itself is wrong, argues Marty Bent.
In a Dec. 14 episode, Bent acknowledged that advances in quantum computing could undermine systems built on today’s public-key cryptography. But he pushed back on the popular narrative that Bitcoin developers are ignoring the problem or are unprepared.
“Short answer is yes, it is a risk,” Bent said. “But it’s not only a risk for Bitcoin. It’s a risk for any system that depends on cryptography for security.” He emphasized that the conversation has already moved from abstract panic to concrete research and design work.
The clearest example: a recent Blockstream paper from Jonas Nick and Mikhail Kutunov, highlighted by Nick in a Dec. 9 post on X. The paper analyzes hash-based, post-quantum signature schemes specifically optimized for Bitcoin’s constraints rather than treating the network like a generic crypto benchmark. Nick’s summary notes that hash-based signatures — which rest only on hash functions, a primitive Bitcoin already trusts — can be tuned for better size and performance trade-offs. He said signature sizes could be reduced to roughly 3–4 KB, putting them in the same ballpark as some lattice-based schemes (ML-DSA), and argued their work explores how parameter choices affect real-world costs.
Bent frames that work as a signal: researchers are mapping the design space and testing options, not pretending the problem doesn’t exist. But he also underlined why any change will be slow and cautious.
“Bitcoin is a globally distributed peer-to-peer system that depends on consensus protocol rules that are very hard to change,” Bent said. “And you really don’t want to change them too often.” Transitioning to quantum-resistant signatures isn’t just a matter of swapping algorithms — it touches address types, HD wallets, multisig and threshold schemes, and must preserve compatibility for nearly 17 years of deployed infrastructure.
Performance and decentralization are core constraints. Many post-quantum schemes are data-heavy: larger signatures increase bandwidth demands, slow block propagation, and raise the cost of running a full node — all of which can harm Bitcoin’s decentralization. That’s why Blockstream’s paper focuses on optimizations that shave signature sizes and keep verification costs manageable. Bent summarized their findings as promising: “You get quantum resistance, but at the same time it remains conducive for people to download full nodes and verify transactions without needing a significant amount of bandwidth and data storage.”
He was careful not to oversell the work as a finished fix. Rather, it’s preparatory research to keep options open if quantum advances accelerate.
“This is by no means like, ‘hey, we solved the problem,’” Bent said. “But we are taking this problem seriously, doing research and beginning to figure out ways in which we could solve the quantum risk that may or may not manifest in the medium to long term.”
Bent also noted a common misdirection in public debate: Bitcoin gets singled out, but so much of the internet — browsers, TLS, SSH, and many services — would face similar pressure in a post-quantum world. As he put it, “If quantum computers do come, Bitcoin is not the only thing. Almost everything you touch on the internet is depending on some cryptographic security at some point.”
The broader takeaway: quantum risk is real, and progress in quantum hardware deserves attention. But the idea that developers are ignoring it doesn’t match the activity in technical circles. Researchers and cryptographers are actively exploring practical, Bitcoin-friendly post-quantum options — not as an immediate rollback, but as groundwork so the network can adapt without jeopardizing decentralization or compatibility.
At press time BTC traded at $89,854.
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