July 28, 2026 ChainGPT

AmericanFortress rolls out ZK-PoSP to make wallets quantum‑safe without changing addresses

AmericanFortress rolls out ZK-PoSP to make wallets quantum‑safe without changing addresses
AmericanFortress rolls out a plan to make existing crypto wallets “quantum-safe” — without forcing users to move funds or change addresses. What they proposed AmericanFortress published a technical paper, Zero-Knowledge Proof of Seed Provenance (ZK-PoSP), on the IACR ePrint archive. The idea: let a wallet prove it knows the seed that generated an address without revealing the seed itself, using zero-knowledge proofs. In practice, wallets would produce proofs that can be verified on-chain (or at the node level) so the existing address can be retained while gaining post-quantum protections. Why it matters If sufficiently powerful quantum computers arrive, they could run Shor’s algorithm to recover private keys from exposed public keys and steal funds. Bitcoin and Ethereum currently use secp256k1 elliptic-curve keys; Solana commonly uses Ed25519. ZK-PoSP is designed to work with both curves and with hierarchical deterministic wallet standards such as BIP32 and SLIP-10, enabling a continuity path that avoids mass key rotations or forced fund migrations. How ZK-PoSP would work in the ecosystem - Wallets generate zero-knowledge proofs that they know the seed for an address. Those proofs are based on hash functions and the security properties of the proof system. - Blockchains would verify proofs via a node-level software upgrade; wallet providers must produce the proofs. - The mechanism is intended to run alongside existing signature schemes and could replace classical signing only if quantum attacks make that necessary. Security caveats AmericanFortress describes the design as “post-quantum” based on hash-function hardness and their ZKP soundness, but the paper notes this security is conjectured — it has not been tested against a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (none exist today). Google’s Quantum AI team has estimated that breaking 256-bit elliptic-curve cryptography might require on the order of 1,500 logical qubits and tens of millions of quantum gates (error-corrected qubits, not current noisy devices), so an immediate network-level threat is not indicated. Performance and costs (lab figures) - One-time proof to secure an address: ~ $0.002 on a 16-core server. - Per-transaction proof: ~ $0.00125. - Signing time in current implementation: ~12 seconds. - Verification time: ~9–10 milliseconds. These measurements come from AmericanFortress’s tests; actual blockchain integration could change storage, bandwidth, and compute costs. Implementation details and business model - The proofs are built with RISC Zero and do not require a trusted setup. - AmericanFortress plans to license an SDK to blockchains and projects; adoption will depend on independent technical review, audits, network consensus, and commercial terms. Industry context Institutional interest in post-quantum protection is growing. The Bitcoin Security Consortium — backed by BlackRock, Coinbase, and other firms — recently pledged $15 million toward post-quantum research as its first focus. For custodians, exchanges, ETFs, and corporate treasuries, solutions that preserve existing addresses could avoid complex operational and legal migrations. But ZK-PoSP would only help once developers, miners, nodes, wallet vendors, and users accept the necessary changes. Other approaches Ethereum is pursuing a different route: the Ethereum Foundation has a post-quantum team testing hash-based signatures, a minimal zero-knowledge virtual machine, and migration tools as part of its quantum-security roadmap. The bottom line ZK-PoSP offers a promising path to preserve current addresses while adding a layer of post-quantum defense, but it faces the same hurdles as any major cryptographic change: rigorous independent review, implementation audits, and broad network agreement. “Today’s implementation is already practical for institutional settlement,” AmericanFortress CEO Michal “Mehow” Pospieszalski said, noting that hardware acceleration and proving-system improvements could reduce signing times further. Read more AI-generated news on: undefined/news